By the end of 1980s, computers were competing with grandmasters, apparently approving of human-like intelligence. However, a philosopher who wrote a paper called “Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence” questioned whether computers playing chess are proofs of intelligence. This was Hubert Dreyfus, who had actually taken up a challenge to play against a computer at chess, and lost. As Dreyfus suggested following his defeat, there are two ways of playing the game, mechanically and inspirationally. For him, “the point remained that the attempt to create a ‘disembodied’ intelligence, a pure symbol-manipulating machine, was doomed because intelligence is intimately connected with the human system that embodies it” (Wooley, 1992, pg. 114), the mind.

There are just a lot of things that a machine can’t have that humans do, which basically makes the production of human-like androids very ambiguous. As said by Professor Jefferson, another philosopher who wrote Orations in 1949, 'Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain — that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.'

First of all, the mind is a totally isolated matter from anything else we say ‘worldly’, as Descartes claims. It is simply an independent system. Moreover, other factors should still be considered that distinguished man from any ‘sub-human’. These machines cannot just be conscious, though they seem to be. Being conscious beings, we are able to produce knowledge, while machines can only imitate them.

John Searle, also a philosopher, supports this argument with his Chinese-Room Theory.

“…suppose we have written a computer program that passes the Turing Test and demonstrates "general intelligent action." Suppose, specifically that the program can converse in fluent Chinese. Write the program on 3x5 cards and give them to an ordinary person. Lock the person into a room and have him follow the instructions on the cards. He will copy out Chinese characters and pass them in and out of the room through a slot. From the outside, it will appear that the Chinese room contains a fully intelligent person who speaks Chinese. The question is this: is there anyone (or anything) in the room that understands Chinese? That is, is there anything that has the mental state of understanding, or which has conscious awareness of what is being discussed in Chinese? The man is clearly not aware. The room can't be aware. The cards certainly aren't aware. Searle concludes that the Chinese room or any other physical symbol system, cannot have a mind.”

In simple terms, Searle tries to bring up the fact that machines only run in a way they are programmed to be. Regarding game playing, Margaret Robertson, a game consultant, says “When you play, what you're doing is going up against the men behind the machine.”

“You can have something that exhibits intelligent properties - a calculator exhibits intelligent properties - but it doesn't necessarily follow that it's conscious,” says Discovery Institute’s Jay Richards. Yes, computers or machines would really be able to do a lot--- from solving ever difficult Math17 problems to piloting a space cruise ship ala Wall-E storyline. But machines won’t be a lot.

"If there are cyborgs running out there who can enjoy Beethoven, and even write philosophy and supposedly reproduce themselves, I'm still worth as much. Theologically, I'd say human beings are still unique." - Professor John Jefferson Davis, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary.